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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ; 
vs. ; 
RAYMOND ORTIZ, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
i Case No. 880378-CA 
i (Priority No. 2) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a criminal action 
filed within 30 days of the date of sentencing of the Defendant. 
Because the Defendant was convicted of two Second Degree Felonies, 
jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Section 78-2a-
3, Utah Code Annotated. (1953, as amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a direct appeal in a criminal case from a sentence 
and commitment of Appellant to the Utah State Prison for two Second 
Degree Felonies after a finding of guilty to the offense of Theft, 
a Second Degree Felony, under Utah Code Annotated, Section 6-405, 
(1953, as amended). 
. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. The Defendant was denied a fair trial and the conviction 
should be reversed because the Court did not enter any findings in 
denying the Motion to limit the prosecution from cross-examining 
the Defendant as to his prior convictions, 
2. The Court erred in not declaring a mistrial in light of 
the Prosecutor's statements. 
3. The evidence was insufficient to prove intent and the 
evidence is insufficient to support the jury verdict* 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 12, states that , "In criminal prosecutions 
the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel . . . ". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The Defendant-Appellant was charged in an information with 
two Counts of Theft, a Second Degree Felony, and was convicted of 
both Counts. After trial, the Court sentenced the Defendant on 
one Count after granting the Motion of the Defendant to sentence 
on both Counts of being part of a single criminal episode. 
B. Course of Proceeding. 
After the jury found the Defendant-Appellant guilty, he was 
sentenced on May 9, 1988, to a Second Degree Felony. A Notice of 
Appeal was filed within thirty days. 
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C. Disposition at Trial Court. 
The Defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the 
conviction entered after the jury verdict and the Court denied the 
Motion for a mistrial. , 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The trial held in this case commenced on March 31, 1988 before 
the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, District Court Judge. The trial was 
held before a jury and the Vor Dire of the jury was not 
transcribed. 
The first witness called by the State of Utah was Reginald 
Corona who testified that he owned a bar located at 6750 South 
State Street, Murray, Utah (Pg. 4). Mr. Corona indicated that in 
July, 1987, he became acquainted with the Defendant, Raymond Ortiz, 
and met him at a business establishment that was located just south 
of his bar. Mr. Corona recalled that the name of the business was 
Eagle Tire and that during their first conversation, Mr. Ortiz 
indicated that he had just purchased the business (Pg. 6). 
The witness indicated that the Defendant told him that he had 
borrowed money through the S.B.A. and that after Mr. Corona 
indicted that he was interested in also obtaining an S.B.A. loan, 
Mr. Ortiz stated that he knew somebody who could get the loan for 
him (Pg. 7). The witness testified that Mr. Ortiz indicated to him 
that he would have to "front some money to show that he was in good 
faith" in order to get a loan of between $350,000 and $400,000. 
Mr. Corona then testified that a later conversation took place at 
his bar three to four days after the first conversation, at which 
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time the Defendant told Mr. Corona that he had not been able to 
contact any person concerning the loan (Pg. 9). The witness then 
indicated that several days after this conversation, the witness 
indicated Mr. Ortiz said that the person who would obtain the loan 
for him was, according to Mr. Corona, in charge of S.B.A. loans 
through Valley Bank and that he would deliver the paperwork to this 
individual on behalf of Mr. Corona (Pg. 10). 
Mr. Corona indicated that several weeks after this initial 
conversation, a subsequent conversation took place at the tire shop 
at which time Mr. Ortiz indicated to Mr. Corona that Mr. Ortiz 
needed to bring $5,000.00 in cash in a cashier's check. An Exhibit 
was introduced which consisted of a Tracy Collins check payable to 
Ray Ortiz in the sum of $5,000.00 (Exhibit "H", Pg. 13). The 
witness stated that Mr. Ortiz told him that the fellow at Valley 
Bank had received the July 15, 1987 check (Pg. 15). 
Mr. Corona testified that about August 4, 1987, Mr. Ortiz told 
Mr. Corona that a second $5,000.00 payment was needed because they 
were getting ready to send the papers to Denver and that the person 
needed to have another $5,000.00 check to make sure that Mr. Corona 
wasn't going to change his mind (Pg. 17). Mr. Corona indicated 
that he went to Tracy Collins Bank and obtained another check under 
the name of "Richard L. Gray" (Pg. 20). He stated that the name, 
Richard Gray, was used because he obtained that name through some 
of the papers that Mr. Ortiz had left for him to sign and that in 
the papers, there was located a card from Richard L. Gray at Valley 
Bank (Pg. 21). 
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The witness testified that the next day, Mr. Ortiz came to 
him and indicated that the name had to be changed because the 
person didn't want it in his name and it had to be under the name 
of Ray Ortiz (Pg. 25). Mr. Corona indicated that Mr. Ortiz 
indicated that Richard Gray had allegedly stated that he did not 
want to show that he had accepted any money concerning the loan 
and, therefore, Mr. Corona obtained a second cashier's check on 
August 7, 1987 which was substituted for the check with the name 
of Richard Gray and delivered it to Mr. Ortiz (Pg. 26). The 
witness indicated that Mr. Ortiz told him that he would proceed 
through and obtain the S.B.A. loan with that and that he would 
guarantee the loan (Pg. 27). 
Mr. Corona stated that he did not receive an S.B.A. loan 
through any of the loan applications that he had signed up through 
the date of the trial (Pg. 27). He indicated that Mr. Ortiz kept 
telling him not to worry about the loan, stating that "it's there." 
Later, he paid a $100.00 retainer fee and another fee of 
$400.00 to a person to assist him to fill out forms for an S.B.A. 
loan which he obtained through Brighton Bank. He indicated he 
never did receive the $10,000.00 back, which had been transferred 
to Mr. Ortiz. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Corona testified that sometime in 
August of 1987, he met freguently with a person by the name of Rick 
Hansen (Pg. 36). He stated that whenever he was at Eagle Tire, the 
business establishment which was managed by Mr. Ortiz, that Mr. 
Rick Hansen was there on a daily basis. He understood that Mr. 
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Rick Hansen was a silent partner of Mr* Ortiz and that Mr* Corona 
met with Mr* Hansen and a person from Atlanta, Georgia, who was in 
Salt Lake City to help obtain a loan through Ray Ortiz (Pg. 42). 
Mr. Corona testified that this person, Gerry Hancey-Hedderick, 
discussed with him on three or four occasions, possible loans and 
indicated to him that Ray Ortiz had sent her to Salt Lake City to 
help Mr. Corona get the loan (Pg. 43). He indicated that he even 
paid the expenses of $500.00 to Gerry Hancey-Hedderick in 
connection with her trips to Salt Lake City (Pg. 45). 
The witness testified that he kept limited notes of the 
transaction and that the business card which allegedly was given 
to him by the Defendant, was discarded and that he obtained a card 
which he originally identified to the police as being the card 
which he received from Mr. Ortiz directly from Valley Bank and Mr. 
Gray, when he went there personally concerning a loan (Pg. 49). 
He had no copies of any of the loan documents which he supposedly 
had signed, and identified at trial a packet of documents which he 
said were "similar" to the package of documents which he had 
allegedly signed (Pg. 51). 
The State's principal witness also identified Defendant's 
Exhibit #10 which was a check made out to him for $10,000.00 from 
Eagle Tire. Mr. Corona indicated that Ray Ortiz gave him that 
check on or about September 1, 1987 and that it did not clear the 
bank. 
The second witness called by the State of Utah at the trial 
was Richard Gray, a commercial loan officer at Valley Bank (Pg. 
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80). He testified that he recalled receiving a telephone call from 
Mr. Corona concerning an inguiry about getting an S.B.A. loan (Pg. 
87). On cross-examination, he admitted that Mr. Corona just asked 
about setting up an S.B.A. loan and did not discuss any problems 
or anything unusual about the loan process. Mr. Gray indicated the 
Mr. Corona had no complaints concerning him or his processing of 
any loans and that if Mr. Corona had come in and told him that he 
had paid to Mr. Gray the sum of $10,000.00 for an S.B.A. loan, that 
he would have recalled that fact (Pg. 88). 
After the State rested, the Defendant called as the first 
witness, Officer Scott Hansen who testified that he was employed 
at the Murray City Police Department and was contacted by Mr. 
Corona (Pg. 96). He also testified to many statements that Mr. 
Corona had made to him at the time of the initial reports to the 
officer in this matter. One of the statements that was reported, 
indicated that Mr. Corona stated that Mr. Ortiz' $10,000.00 was to 
be used as a fee for expenses and assisting to secure a $400,000 
loan through the S.B.A. (Pg. 98). The officer admitted that at the 
time of the preliminary hearing, he testified that the card which 
Mr. Corona gave to him was a card which was given to Mr. Corona by 
Mr. Ortiz and not a card which he had obtained independently from 
Mr. Gray at Valley Bank (Pg. 99). 
The second defense witness was Andy Ortiz, the father of Ray 
Ortiz, who is a retired construction worker, who received a 
telephone call, in August, 1987, from Mr. Corona (Pg. 104). In 
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that telephone conversation, Mr* Ortiz indicated that Mr. Corona 
stated that the $10,000.00 was a loan to his son (Pg. 105). 
The final witness called by the defense was the Defendant, 
Raymond Ortiz, who testified that, in the summer of 1987, he 
managed Eagle Tire store, in Murray, Utah for the owner, Mr. Rick 
Hansen (Pg. 110). All of the checking accounts were in the name 
of Rick Hansen and he did not have any signature authority on any 
of the accounts. He indicated that he and another employee did 
most of the mechanical work in relation to the installation of 
tires and that Mr. Hansen took care of the financial activities 
(Pg. 111). He indicated that, in 1987, he met Mr. Corona, who 
operated the bar next to the tire store and that Mr. Corona stated 
that he was trying to get a loan and was unsuccessful in obtaining 
a loan. Mr. Ortiz indicated that he told him that he knew someone 
who probably could get him a loan if he was really interested in 
it and that he transferred the cash from the two $5,000.00 checks 
he received to Mr. Rick Hansen. Mr. Ortiz testified that Gerry 
Hancey-Hedderick gave him a business card similar to the business 
card which was given to Mr. Corona which had been introduced into 
evidence. He stated he had never known her personally and that she 
was an acguaintance of Mr. Rick Hansen and that she met with Mr. 
Corona, Mr. Hansen and himself in the summer of 1987 (Pg. 123). 
Mr. Ortiz indicated that most of Mr. Corona's conversations 
took place with Mr. Hansen and not himself and that, as far as he 
knew, Gerry Hancey-Hedderick was going to obtain the loan and that 
the loan had been approved for Mr. Corona (Pg. 126). He stated 
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that he did not guarantee the loan as Mr. Corona had testified (Pg. 
127). The witness testified that in November, 1987, he had been 
convicted of prior felonies involving Communications Fraud and 
Theft by Deception (Pg. 128). 
On cross-examination, the Defendant testified that the only 
reason he knew the checks were in his name was because Mr. Corona 
trusted him. He stated that the dealings were taking place between 
Mr. Hansen and Mr. Corona and his only involvement was in cashing 
the checks and turning the money over to Mr. Hansen (Pg. 131). Mr. 
Ortiz indicated that he had attempted to pay back the funds because 
he felt there was a moral obligation because of the money that Mr. 
Corona had paid out, even though he contemplated bringing a lawsuit 
against Mr. Hansen in this matter (Pg. 141). 
During closing argument, the Prosecutor made the following 
argument to which the Court sustained an objection by defense 
counsel: 
Even though the dates of those convictions are less than 
a year apart in 1985, 1986, and now, he is also charged, 
in 1987, with identical crimes, that is not the purpose 
of the felony convictions. That is to be used only if 
you find and believe that such a fact indicates that a 
person is more likely to tell a falsehood to question his 
credibility. I have heard other arguments in other cases 
where it says, "Well, look, if he gets on the stand and 
has to admit to those felonies and take the risk of being 
convicted on that, he must be telling the truth." Well, 
he obviously didn't change his behavior from 1985 to 
1986. 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PRETRIAL 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR CONVICTION FOR 
THEFT BY DECEPTION. 
Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a pretrial Motion to limit 
evidence of prior convictions under Utah Rules of Evidence 609. 
(Transcript of Pretrial Motions of 3-31-88, page 2.) The Defendant 
had been convicted in November, 1987, with the felony offenses of 
Communications Fraud and Theft by Deception, and the defense made 
a pretrial Motion to limit this evidence which was heard by the 
trial Court and denied. 
The Defendant argued that under the authority of State v. 
Gentry, 747 P. 2d, 1032 (Utah, 1987), and Rule 609 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, that the prior convictions in Utah for Theft by 
Deception must be excluded in the pending Theft by Deception 
matter. In Gentry, the Supreme Court held that in an aggravated 
sexual assault trial, the Defendant's prior rape conviction should 
have been excluded at trial. After noting that the crime of rape 
did not inherently reflect the Defendant's credibility, the Court 
stated: 
Also significant is the similarity between the 
conviction and the crime for which defendant was tried, 
aggravated sexual assault. This was highly likely to 
prejudice jurors and unduly influence their conclusion 
concerning defendant's guilt. 
Counsel for the Defendant Ortiz, argued in support of the Motion 
as follows: 
So I would submit that the Court cannot, just 
because the prior offense is Theft by Deception or 
Communications Fraud, determine that they are necessarily 
involving dishonesty or false statements. 
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Finally, I think that under Rule 403, that this 
Court has discretion to use the weighing factors set 
forth in Subparagraph (1) of Paragraph (a) to determine 
even if it's an offense that involves dishonesty or false 
statements. That under Rule 403, which is — the Court 
can still determine that the prejudicial effect and the 
prejudicial effect of having similar offenses coming in 
against Mr* Ortiz if he takes the stand outweighs the 
probative value. The Court's inherent power under Rule 
403 to control the trial would also give the Court power, 
and we'd ask the Court to grant the motion on that basis. 
The Court denied the Motion and allowed the Defendant to be 
examined about the conviction. The Defendant testified on direct 
questioning concerning the conviction in an attempt to mitigate the 
result of the Court's ruling. 
In the recent case of State v. Wight (Case Number 87-558-CA, 
Utah, 1988) this Court extensively reviewed the federal decision 
concerning Rule 609 of the Rules of Evidence. Indicating that the 
new Utah Rules of Evidence were intended to provide a fresh 
starting place, the Court followed interpretations given to Rule 
609 by the federal cases of United States v. Carroll, 663 F. Supp. 
210 (D. Md. 1986) and United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F. 2d 1049 
(D.C. Cir., 1983). 
This Court approved of the procedure employed in United States 
v. Carroll, where the trial court applied a factual inquiring 
process in a case where the prosecution wished to use prior 
convictions for Bank Larceny and Theft. The Court noted that the 
proponent, the prosecutor, had the burden of showing the conviction 
rested on facts warranting the dishonesty or false statement 
description. United States v. Papia, 560 P. 2d 827, at 847 (7th 
Cir. 1977). 
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In Wight, the Court indicated that under 609 (a)(2) inguiry 
should be made regarding the particular facts involved to determine 
if honesty was a factor* If the trial court finds honesty is 
involved in the underlying offense, evidence of the prior 
conviction is automatically admissible under 609 (a)(2). The Court 
then stated: 
If such inguiry is not made or does not reveal acts 
of dishonesty or false statement, the trial court must 
apply 609(a) (1) and weigh probativeness against prejudice 
to the defendant in determining admissibility. Contrary 
to the concurring opinion, we do not believe this will 
be a burden on the trial courts, but will give them 
greater flexibility to either find circumstances 
indicating dishonesty, or engage in a balancing process 
to determine probative value, an exercise with which 
trial courts are familiar. 
The Court of Appeals then found that since no inguiry 
concerning the underlying facts about the robbery conviction of 
Mr. Wightf s was made by the trial court, the conviction was not 
admissible under Utah Rules of Evidence, 609(a)(2). Furthermore, 
because the trial Judge did not employ on the record the criteria 
set forth in State v. Banner, 717 P. 2d 1325 (Utah, 1986), the Court 
found that error was committed in introducing the prior conviction 
and denying the Motion to limit the evidence. The Court found the 
error in that case to be harmless after a review of the record 
concerning the consumption of alcohol, blood alcohol content and 
other facts concerning the auto accident. 
In Appellant's case, the Defendant asked the Court to consider 
the prejudicial effect of introducing a conviction identical to the 
conviction for which the Appellant was on trial and to weigh the 
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harmful effect of requiring the Defendant to answer to the 
conviction* The potential for prejudice was as great in this case 
as was present in State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah, 1987). 
In the present case, the prosecution did not offer any 
incriminating documentary evidence other than two $5,000.00 checks 
used to transfer funds. The purpose of the transfer of funds was 
based upon the testimony of the alleged victim, Reginald Corona, 
as apparent by the testimony of the Defendant. The State did not 
produce any of the loan applications or similar documents which Mr. 
Corona purportedly signed in relation to this matter. The State 
did not present any evidence of any underlying facts of the prior 
conviction. The prosecutor in the pretrial motions argued that 
since the underlying charge of Theft by Deception involved 
dishonesty or false statements that the similar conviction should 
be used because the "main essence of the case" was credibility. 
(Transcript of Pretrial Motions, 3-31-88, page 9.) 
The critical consequences of denying the Motion to Exclude 
the Evidence in the context of this case is graphically illustrated 
by the manner in which the prosecutor used the conviction in 
closing argument. The record reflects the following argument to 
the jury: 
MR. IWASAKI: The fact that a witness has been convicted 
of a felony and/or convicted of a crime involving 
dishonest or false statement is to be used by you only 
in weighing his credibility. 
I'm not saying, "Find Mr. Ortiz guilty of Theft by 
Deception because he's previously been convicted of Theft 
by Deception, and he's previously been convicted of a 
Communications Fraud. 
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Even though the dates of those convictions are less than 
a year apart in 1985, 1986, and now, he's also charged 
in 1987 with identical crimes, that is not the purpose 
of the felony convictions. That is to be used only if 
you find and believe that such a fact indicates a person 
is more likely to tell a falsehood to question his 
credibility. 
I've heard other arguments in other cases where it says, 
"Well, look if he gets on the stand and has to admit to 
those felonies and take the risk of being convicted on 
that, he must be telling the truth." Well, he obviously 
didn't change his behavior from 1985 to 1986. 
MR GAITHER: I am going to object, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. IWASAKI: The testimony is not believable, and it is 
a basis for you to look at the prior felony convictions. 
(Transcript of the Trial, page 151). 
Therefore, the Court should enter an order revoking the 
conviction and awarding the Appellant a trial not prejudicially 
tainted by the improper evidence. 
POINT II 
THE REMARKS OF THE PROSECUTOR DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT, 
OBJECTED TO BY THE DEFENDANT, REQUIRED THE GRANTING OF 
A NEW TRIAL. 
In State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah, 1986), the Supreme 
Court reviewed a criminal case in which a prosecutor, in his 
closing argument, improperly argued that Defendant's prior burglary 
conviction demonstrated his criminal character. That case involved 
theft by receiving trial in which the Defendant took the stand and 
testified that he had been previously convicted of a burglary. In 
Tarafa, the Prosecutor made the following argument: 
It's a criminal mind. He's a thief with a criminal mind 
and a criminal mind at work here . . . . 
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The Defendant is the kind of person, ladies and 
gentlemen, who would use a false credit card to obtain 
property for himself* He is the kind of person who would 
commit a burglary, who would go into someone's home and 
steal their purse—he admitted he did* 
He is the kind of person who would obtain property 
by fraudulent use of a credit card, and I ask you to 
weigh that and weigh that heavily when you examine the 
testimony he gave you* He's the kind of person who would 
walk into somebody's home and steal their purse. He's 
a thief, and I'd ask you to weigh that carefully when you 
weigh his testimony. 
As in the Defendant's case, the defense counsel objected and 
made a Motion for a mistrial. The Utah Supreme Court stated that 
under the Utah Rules of Evidence, 404 (a)(3), 608 (b) and 609, the 
Prosecutor improperly argued to the jury that Defendant had a 
propensity to commit crime. The Court then discussed the test set 
forth in State v* Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah, 1984) which should be 
used to determine whether prosecutional misconduct merits a 
reversal in a particular case. In reviewing, the Court said that 
the Troy test had the following threshold: 
1) Whether the remarks called the attention of the jurors 
to matters which they were not justified in considering 
in determining their verdict/ and, 
2) Whether the jurors, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, were probably influenced by the remarks. 
In this case, the Defendant-Appellant submits that the 
Prosecutor was aware of the proscription placed in arguing in the 
area concerning the Defendant's character. The Prosecutor 
attempted to state his positive argument in a negative light by 
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stating "I'm not saying, 'find Mr* Ortiz guilty because he's 
previously been convicted of Communications Fraud'"* The attorney 
for the State argued in a manner which belies his knowledge of the 
improper use of the evidence* The County Attorney is not charged 
with admonishing the jury not to use the evidence in an improper 
way. A full reading of his arguments establishes that he was 
calling to the jury matters which they were not justified in 
considering and the jury was influenced by those remarks* 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant-Appellant was denied a fair trial by the denial 
of the Order which would have protected him from the prejudicial 
effect of the prior similar case for which he was on trial. The 
error was aggravated and compounded by the Prosecutor's sly remarks 
designed to emphasize the prejudicial and improper use of the 
evidence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ f day of January ,^T989. 
IDALL GApHEIT 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant was hand delivered to Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
on this day of January, 1989. 
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ADDENDUM 
1) Copy of relevant portions of closing argument and 
Objection, pages 152 and 153. 
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ordered to sustain in this case. And I gladly accept the 
reasonable standard because as reasonable people, you can 
see through the testimony of Mr. Ortez and the attempt to 
try and foist all the blame onto the empty chair. 
The fact that a witness has been convicted 
of a felony and/or convicted of a crime involving 
dishonest or false statement is to be used by you only in 
weighing his credibility. 
I'm not saying, "Find Mr. Ortez guilty of 
theft by deception because he's previously been convicted 
of theft by deception, and he's previously been convicted 
of a communications fraud. 
Even though the dates of those convictions 
are less than a year apart in 1985, 1986, and now, he's 
also charged in 1987 with identical crimes, that is not 
the purpose of the felony convictions. That is to be 
used only if you find and believe that such a fact 
indicates a person is more likely to tell a falsehood. 
To question his credibility. 
I've heard other arguments in other cases 
where it says, "Well, look if he gets on the stand and 
has to admit to those felonies and take the risk of being 
convicted on that, he must be telling the truth." Well, 
he obviously didn't change his behavior from 1985 to '86. 
MR. GAITHER: I am going on object, your 
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Honor. 
THE COURT; Sustained. 
MR. IWASAKI: The testimony is not 
believable, and it is a basis for you to look at the 
prior felony convictions. 
Everybody talked about the checks. Look at 
the check made out to Richard Gray. As you recall 
Mr. Corona's testimony, Mr. Corona made the check out to 
Richard Gray because he found that information on the 
business card. 
You've heard testimony of Richard Gray that 
he gives out packets of that nature. This was not a name 
that was just pulled out of the air regardless of whether 
he wrote it down or subsequently lost it or threw it in 
his desk or 
person with 
whatever. Richard Gray is a person and is a 
SBA with Valley Bank. Coincidence of all 
coincidences. The same type of person, 
Valley Bank 
going to be 
through SBA that Mr. Ortez 
going through. 
an official at 
said the loan was 
Now, Mr. Corona says he issued him this 
check, and the next day Mr. Ortez comes 
"Ah, change 
this thing. 
that. He doesn't want his 
Put it in my name, cash." 
Mr. Ortez says that Mr. Hansen told him 
this. Don't 
back and says, 
name involved in 
All right, 
, "Hey, change 
. want Gray's name on it. Put it in your 
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